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Barth, Barthes, and Bergson: Postmodern
Aesthetics and the Imperative of the New
Paul Douglass
San Jose State University
Now, if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our
conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental
absurdity. . . we commend him for having known us better than we knew
ourselves. This is not the case, however. . . [for] he in his turn is only offering
us its shadow: but he has arranged this shadow in such a way as to make us
suspect the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it.
—Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will (133-34)
The writerly text is a perpetual present, upon which no consequent language
(which would inevitably make it past) can be superimposed; the writerly
text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as
function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular
system. . . [and] the codes it mobilizes extend as far as the eye can reach.
—Roland Barthes, S/Z (5-6)

Literary Modernism exhibits a drive toward theory that precedes its
appearance. Indeed, serious literary endeavor after the emergence of French
Naturalism seems burdened by the responsibility to comment on—ideally, to
add to—the theory of literary art. The emergence of Symbolism, Imagism,
Dadaism, Futurism, Vorticism, Surrealism, and their prolific and
rambunctious descendants attests to the truth of Barth’s observation that
“[O]ne characteristic preoccupation, among others, of modernists and
protomodernists was the problematics, not only of language, but of the
medium and processes of literature: a manifestation of their heightened
authorial self-consciousness” (Friday Book 209; italics are Barth’s). For the selfconsciously modern writer, novelty and experimentation became obligatory
elements of a theory-into-practice pattern codified in the modernist period.
Bergsonian aesthetics have furnished a useful key to the way twentiethcentury writers posited and resolved aesthetic problems,1 and the continuities
and disruptions implicit in the term “postmodern” can also be teased out and
better perceived through a Bergsonian lens.2 That is due to a much-noted
peculiarity of the movement called “Modernism.” It has passed into history,
and yet the “modern era” has not ended, and perhaps cannot end until
humanity ceases to believe it is living in a constantly modernizing present.
Bergsonian aesthetics dictate that art must constantly reinvent itself, and
modernist writers undertook this strenuous work, which is predicated upon
the theory of a reader reading (Barthes’s writerly text)—of text in action—
enacted, acting out. Bergson brought together and consolidated ideas about art
34
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and literature that focused upon the experience of the reader and the illusions
of art. In Bergson’s thinking, the need to disrupt familiar pleasures coincides
with a de-emphasis of, or more accurately, a lessening of interest in the
authorial role—stated another way, the merging of authorship with readership
in a “plural” text that evades definition and categorization—a text that evokes
the flow of consciousness itself, protean and radically “open”—nothing less
than the immediacy of existence, the present, which Bergson defines as
perpetual novelty, or “simply what is being made” (Matter and Memory 193).
Bergson’s thought proves a useful key to postmodern literary practice3 and not
coincidentally a precursor of poststructuralist thought.

Bergson and Modernist Aesthetics: A Brief
Introduction
It is often good to begin with irony, when available, and there is no lack
here. First, there is the fact that the “heightened authorial self-consciousness”
of which Barth speaks has led to the disintegration of conventional ideas of
authorship. Another irony, where Bergson is concerned, lies in the swing of
modern artists toward “theory-into-practice,” an inversion he deplored. “What
is common today,” he commented in 1911, “is that theory precedes creation. . .
yes, in everything: in the arts as in the sciences. . . . For the arts I would prefer
genius, and you?” Pragmatically, he admits, “we have lost simplicity, it is
necessary to replace it with something” (Maurice-Verne; trans. by and qtd. in
Antliff 3). Bergson disliked art produced according to “a school or theory”
(Antliff 185, n. 2). Yet he was charged with inaugurating “wild
experimentalism,” as Jacques Maritain wrote disapprovingly in Bergsonian
Philosophy (66), which led to the proliferation of theoretical ideas about art.
Regardless of Bergson’s own disapproval of such heavily theorized
movements as Cubism or Surrealism, his philosophy exercised a crucial
influence upon the international upheaval in the arts occurring in the first
decades of the twentieth century. Bergsonism celebrates artistic insight, and
Bergsonian aesthetics assert that art can restore contact with an inner life from
which “modern” populations are increasingly alienated. As William James
wrote, reading Bergson was “like the breath of the morning and the song of
the birds” (Pluralistic Universe 270), not only because Bergson’s prose was
exhilarating, but because he opened doors to new vistas of artistic creation and
enlightenment—a possible path back from the abyss of ennui in modern urban
life.
A great deal of work has now been done to expose the legacy of Bergsonian
thought in the consciously modern literature of the early twentieth century,
including The Waste Land and Four Quartets, Remembrance of Things Past, To the
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Lighthouse and The Waves, Tropic of Capricorn, Of Time and the River, the novels
of Cather, the poetry of Stevens and Frost, and the fiction of Kazantzakis. A
survey of that work is not possible in the space afforded here.4 Suffice to say
that Bergsonism is readily apparent in such prototypical modernist caveats as
Pound’s 1934 demand to “Make It New,” and in Stevens’s instructions for a
“Supreme Fiction”—it must be abstract, must change, and must give pleasure
(Collected Poems 380ff.), or in Stevens’ later assertion that, “The imagination
loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is real” (Necessary Angel 6).
Bergson’s ideas about time, consciousness, memory, experience, and the
universe were exciting to writers as diverse as Henry Miller and Wassily
Kandinsky. His philosophical thought was synthetic, comprehensive,
challenging, and controversial. For example, Bergson was regularly attacked
as an anti-intellectual. He apparently made many people uncomfortable
because he wrote in a non-philosophical, literary style and achieved a
remarkable popularity that at times embarrassed him.5
That popularity was partly due to the visionary aspect of his thought.
Bergson’s philosophy begins with a sort of cosmic revolt. He subscribed to the
Big Bang model that is now the prevailing theory for the origin of the universe,
and his poetics stem from his general view of the universe as a tumultuous
creative action, and of human beings as creators: “For a conscious being, to
exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself
endlessly” (Creative Evolution 7). Bergson’s conception of life as a process of
rebirth animated writers, musicians, painters, and sculptors. Kandinsky,
Picasso, Brancusi, Metzinger, Gleizes, Matisse, and Fergusson were affected by
Bergsonian thought, as Mark Antliff has established in Inventing Bergson. So
were photographers like Alfred Stieglitz, and architects like Le Corbusier and
Frank Lloyd Wright. Similarly, composers Erik Satie, Arnold Schoenberg and
Paul Hindemith created works that embody a Bergsonian spirit of revolution
and renewal. For example, we know that Schoenberg was reading Bergson as
he worked on the beginnings of what became his dodecaphonic (twelve-tone)
system of composition (Simms 71).
Bergson’s universe may be self-creative, but it is also self-antagonistic. The
energy of the “bang” (the élan vital, or vital impulse, in Bergson’s
nomenclature), decays into static shapes. He likened the universe to the earth:
solid on the surface, but molten inside, and subject to “sudden [volcanic]
explosions whereby it suddenly resumes possession of its innermost nature”
(Laughter 159). Bergson drew upon Spencer and Darwin to argue for a modest
view of the intellect’s ability to grapple with the world’s plurality and chaos.
In Bergson’s theory, the intellect evolved so the mind could cope with the
“absolute originality and unforeseeability” of the élan vital (Creative Evolution
29). To apprehend the world intellectually (rather than intuitively) means to
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“immobilize” it (Matter and Memory 275), and if we accept the intellect’s
version of “life,” then we enter a realm of “the discontinuous. . . the immobile.
. . the dead” (Creative Evolution 165, Time and Free Will 237). To live only by the
intellect means to become walking shadows of ourselves, “[h]arnessed, like
yoked oxen, to a heavy task” (Creative Evolution 191).
For Bergson, the appearance of a shadow self—called dédoublement, or
doubling—is natural, inevitable. Most of the time we live “outside ourselves,”
aware of our selfhood as “a colourless shadow which pure duration projects
into homogeneous space.” Such a diminished life seems to unfold “in space
rather than in time, [and] we live for the external world rather than for
ourselves, we speak rather than think, we ‘are acted’ rather than act ourselves”
(Time and Free Will 231). The function of art is to overcome the “parasitic self
which continually encroaches” (Time and Free Will 172) and renew the intuition
of inner life. Bergson believed intellect must be balanced by philosophical
intuition (intuition philosophique), which is epitomized in the arts, particularly
in literature (see Creative Evolution 191). So, for Bergson, alienation
characterizes human life. The “living and concrete self” is constantly being
“covered with an outer crust of clean-cut psychic states” (Time and Free Will
167). The writer cannot change this fact, but by “dissolving or corroding the
outer crust” of our lives, literature can “bring us back to the inner core,”
restore the awareness of “real time,” and take us “back into our own presence”
(Laughter 160; Time and Free Will 133-4).
The daunting nature of this effort immediately becomes apparent, however,
for language “can express the new only as a rearrangement of the old”
(Creative Mind 94, 96): “Language, made for things, converts experiences into
things” (Time and Free Will 130). Artistic intuition can renew language’s
“signals,” making them “into instruments of art” only through subjecting
them to extraordinary pressure (Time and Free Will 96). Poetry, for example,
can rejuvenate dead and dying language by dislocating the reader’s
consciousness: “[B]y rhythmical arrangement of words, which thus become
organized and animated with a life of their own, [poets] tell us—or rather
suggest—things that speech was not calculated to express” (Laughter 156).
Bergson’s path for art is thus, above all, strenuous: “I repudiate facility,” he
said. “I recommend a certain manner of thinking which courts difficulty. I
value effort above everything” (CM 87). Introduction to Metaphysics described
intuition philosophique as a method characterized by struggle: “The mind has to
do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation by which it
habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or rather to recast, all its
categories” (Introduction to Metaphysics 51).
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In fact, Bergson theorizes literature as essentially paradoxical and
subversive. One image cannot evoke the flow of inner life (the durée réelle), but
numerous images, taken “from very diverse orders of things, may, by the
convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point where
there is a certain intuition to be seized” (Introduction to Metaphysics 16-17). The
writer “insinuates” into the reader’s mind a perception of truth by “baffling”
the reader’s thought processes (Laughter 155). Bergson’s aesthetics posit
literary art as seducing the reader into a temporary self-realization, as
dissonant images compete for one’s concentration, requiring “from the mind
the same kind of attention, and in some sort the same degree of tension,” so
that consciousness is drawn almost hypnotically “to appear to itself as it really
is” (Introduction to Metaphysics 16-17). But does art actually break through to
“reality”? Bergson acknowledges that this too is only an illusion—but so
powerfully evoked that it stirs a memory in us of that inner life which is
constantly being covered over by utilitarian forms. The “bold novelist” who
tears aside our “conventional” selves and represents to us the “fundamental
absurdity” of intellectual representations of life has also only shown us a
“shadow.” But by arranging this shadow so that we “suspect the
extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it”—in other
words, the unstoppable flow of inner life—he has “put aside for an instant the
veil which we interposed between our consciousness and ourselves” (Time and
Free Will 133-4). By such a subversion, writers go deep, and “delve yet deeper
still,” groping after “the strains of our inner life’s unbroken melody” (Laughter
156, 150).
So, despite language’s limitations, Bergson thought literature was the
epitome of the arts, which are a reflection of the original cosmic force that
created the universe. Making literature is “toilsome,” but the process is
actually “more precious even than the work which it produces,” because it
means drawing “out from the self more than it had already” (Mind Energy 29).
The jouissance of creation (Barthes’s bliss) echoes the Big Bang: “[J]oy always
announces that life has succeeded, gained ground, conquered. . . . the richer
the creation, the deeper the joy” (ibid.). Human beings’ first line of defense
against the deadness of habituation is finally “language, which furnishes
consciousness with an immaterial body in which to incarnate itself” (Creative
Evolution 264-65). Reversing the metaphor, Bergson also compares “our whole
psychical existence” to “a single sentence, continued since the first awakening
of consciousness, interspersed with commas, but never broken by full stops”
(Mind Energy 70).6
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Modernism and Postmodernism: The Bergsonian
Legacy
The Bergsonian aesthetic legacy consists first in dynamic oppositions: the
élan vital (the vital impulse) versus matter, durée réelle (the flow of real duration)
versus clock time, habitual memory versus pure memory, dédoublement (the
parasitic) versus the inner self. Bergson was a dualistic thinker in the Derridean
mode, for whom concepts "generally go together in couples and represent two
contraries" which cannot be resolved (Introduction to Metaphysics 39). From
such irresolvable contradictions an art emerges based on metalepsis—broken
chains of images or literary gestures that achieve strange and powerful
compression. Above all, Bergson subscribed to the imperatives of constant reinvention and authorial stealth and subversion. These principles and practices,
so evident in modernist practice, are continued in the work of postmodern
writers and thinkers. For example, Barthes’s and Foucault’s assertion of the
author’s disappearance echoes Eliot’s idea of the impersonality of art,
presented in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” or Stephen Dedalus’s
suggestion in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man that “The artist, like the God
of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork,
invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (Joyce
215). Modernist writers also wrote texts designed (like those of Barth and
Pynchon in the 1960s and 1970s) to short-circuit conventional aesthetic
transactions (nominally, “pleasures”) generated by narratives and poetic
imagery in order to evoke a deeper pleasure (Barthes’s jouissance)—for
example, The Waste Land, The Cantos, the first chapter of The Sound and the
Fury. The postmodern concern with undecidability is also already at play in
modernist works like The Waves, Finnegans Wake, and the first chapter of The
Sound and the Fury. In these latter works, particularly, the writer subjects
language to stresses that are metaleptic—almost metamorphic—demanding a
different way of reading, a readerly openness to creativity that Bergson
elucidated in his idea of the “vital impulse” and the joy of creation.
To take one example from the list of oppositions just mentioned, in
modernist works one finds numerous illustrations of the élan vital locked in
endless war with material form. The Waves concludes with a vision of swelling
force and sagging energy: “‘And in me too the wave rises. . . . I strike spurs
into my horse. Against you I will fling myself, unvanquished and unyielding,
O Death!’ The waves broke on the shore” (Woolf 297). In that passage Woolf
echoes Creative Evolution, which describes “the whole of humanity, in space
and time” as “one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each
of us in an overwhelming charge” (Creative Evolution 27l). Frost also described
the élan vital in conflict with matter in “West-running Brook” (1928), with its
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“backward motion toward the source” (Frost 260). Tom Quirk argues that
Willa Cather found her path as a novelist after reading Creative Evolution and
taking up a belief in “the life impetus coursing through the living world” in
constant conflict with its own materializing forms (126, 179). Similarly, Wallace
Stevens made a major advance after a hiatus in his poetic efforts after reading
Creative Evolution (Quirk 186). Stevens became more and more dedicated to the
idea that poetry is the “spirit of visible and invisible change” (Opus Posthumous
242), and that “[t]he mobile and the immobile” flicker “in the area between is
and was,” and even that “the theory / Of poetry is the theory of life” (Collected
Poems 474,486).7
The image of life-energy (the “mobile”) as it endures an inevitable slump
into sentience also appears in postmodern fiction. Vladimir Nabokov ‘s Lolita,
for example, is filled with scenes and jokes based on mechanical or habituated
responses drawn from a Bergsonian theory of life—a comedic technique based
on the contrast between the fluidity of the living élan and the stubbornness of
material forms. As Michael Glynn argues, Humbert Humbert “apprehends
Lolita, Charlotte, and Valeria not as vital changing entities but as his creatures,
as static objects who will act in conformity with his own preconceived
notions” (111). In the crisis of the final pages, as Humbert finishes off Clare
Quilty, he struggles with the reality of the gun, the room, the rug, the blood—
everything, seems alien and diminished: “I may have lost contact with reality
for a second or two,” admits Humbert. The novel is one long delusional
escapade haunted by the image of “Hourglass Lake,” in which Time has had
its neck wrung by a mind as desperate to stop the relentless flow of durée as
Quentin Compson’s in The Sound and the Fury. Humbert is intent on “fixing”
things, refusing to grow or change, dwelling constantly in the past, so that his
perceptions of the present are constantly warped and inaccurate.
Late in life, Nabokov spoke in an interview included in Strong Opinions
about the nature of durée réelle (the flow of real duration) versus clock time. His
vocabulary is expressly Bergsonian:
We can imagine all kinds of time, such as for example “applied time”—time
applied to events, which we measure by means of clocks and calendars; but
those types of time are inevitably tainted by our notion of space, spatial
succession, stretches and sections of space. When we speak of the “passage
of time,” we visualize an abstract river flowing through a generalized
landscape. Applied time, measurable illusions of time, are useful for the
purposes of historians or physicists, they do not interest me, and they did
not interest my creature Van Veen in Part Four of my Ada. He and I in that
book attempt to examine the essence of Time, not its lapse. Van mentions the
possibility of being “an amateur of Time, an epicure of duration,” of being
able to delight sensually in the texture of time, “in its stuff and spread, in the
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fall of its folds, in the very impalpability of its grayish gauze, in the coolness
of its continuum” (Strong Opinions 185).

Nabokov was keenly aware that Time is all-too-human, known not through
clocks, but in “the dim hollow between two rhythmic beats, the narrow and
bottomless silence between the beats, not the beats themselves, which only
embar Time. In this sense human life is not a pulsating heart but the missed
heartbeat” (ibid.). Time outruns perception, giving rise to limitless tricks of
illusion and delusion, as Nabokov’s narrators, from Humbert to Pnin and
Kinbote, testify.
Nabokov’s narrators, like Faulkner’s (Vardaman, Darl, Quentin, Jason) are
mirrored in the azure produced by Barth’s and Pynchon’s protean tale-tellers,
each of whom lives dédoublement—simultaneously true and parasitic.
Pynchon’s narrators in V., The Crying of Lot 49 and Gravity’s Rainbow quest for
their own pasts and personalities, driven by the imperative of constant,
exhausting self-re-invention in the face of devolution and disintegration.
Pynchon’s paranoia was part of a contagious outbreak following World War
II, which was both the product and the cause of a continued feverish
dismantling of literary form—in this case, the novel—in which I believe one
can detect the continuing power of Bergson’s aesthetic challenge to art that it
must perpetually reinvent itself. As Joseph Heller says:
A general disintegration of belief took place [after WW II], and it affected
Catch-22 in that the form of the novel became almost disintegrated. Catch-22
was a collage; if not in structure, then in the ideology of the novel itself . . . .
Without being aware of it, I was part of a near-movement in fiction. While I
was writing Catch-22, J. P. Donleavy was writing The Ginger Man, Jack
Kerouac was writing On the Road, Ken Kesey was writing One Flew Over the
Cuckoo’s Nest, Thomas Pynchon was writing V., and Kurt Vonnegut was
writing Cat’s Cradle. I don’t think any one of us even knew any of the others.
Certainly I didn’t know them. Whatever forces were at work shaping a
trend in art were affecting not just me, but all of us. The feelings of
helplessness and persecution in Catch-22 are very strong in Pynchon and in
Cat’s Cradle. (“Reeling in Catch-22” ix-x)

Whether it stemmed from an existentialist desperation in the post-WW II era,
or is the product of a previously existing desperation that emerged in the
aftermath of WW I, and simply never stopped occurring, may be debated—
but the idea of “experimental literature” rests solidly on a Bergsonian
foundation, and resonates in the work of Alain Robbe-Grillet, Edmund White,
Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, John Fowles, Italo Calvino, and (more
recently) Anne Carson.
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Novelty and Its Discontents: John Barth
This burden of unending novelty created, as Umberto Eco saw it in the
1980s, the predicament of modern authorship:
I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a very
cultivated woman and knows that he cannot say to her “I love you madly,”
because he knows that she knows (and that she knows he knows) that these
words have already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still there is a
solution. He can say “As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.”
At this point, having avoided false innocence, having said clearly it is no
longer possible to talk innocently, he will nevertheless say what he wanted
to say to the woman: that he loves her in an age of lost innocence. (Postscript
67-68)

These themes of lost innocence, belatedness, and the recycling of language are
found in abundance in John Barth’s works. For example, “Life-Story”—first
published in Lost in the Funhouse (1963)—constructs a narrator unable to
breathe life into his story, unable to capture a sense of “real life,” because the
forms in which he is forced to cast this living material are themselves already
dead, or begin to die as soon as he has employed them. In the first sentence he
begins his story “afresh” (though without discarding what he has already
written), and the story thereafter goes through a number of re-starts as he fails
to satisfy himself: “Another story about a writer writing a story! Another
regressus infinitum! Who doesn’t prefer art that at least overtly imitates
something other than its own processes? That doesn’t continually proclaim
‘Don’t forget I’m an artifice!’?” (117). “Life-Story,” like so many pieces in
Funhouse, is haunted by the modernist charge to make fiction new despite an
exhausted field of possibilities, to invent an artistic gesture that is not so
disappointingly familiar to the reader that it is essentially “dead.” Ironically,
this very struggle for freshness leads to clichéd, circular writing: “Why could
he not begin his story afresh X wondered, for example with the words why
could he not begin his story afresh et cetera? Y’s wife came into the study as he
was about to throw out the baby with the bathwater” (119-20). All the drama
here, as in other stories in Barth’s collection, like “Night Sea Journey,”
“Autobiography: A Self-Recorded Fiction,” and “Anonymiad,” is derived
from the struggle of life-writing, the endeavor to push words into life,
dislocate their reality into something living and fluid, because “life is so sweet
and painful and full of such a variety of people” (120). But though the narrator
of “Life-Story” had thought his narrative would be “very long, longer than
Proust’s. . . longer than The Thousand Nights and a Night,” he recognizes that it
is a “short story” and that he (the narrator) is a fiction of his own making—a
conundrum built on fantasies (having multiple mistresses, for example) that
become identical with a “fictional” truth he projects almost as an emanation of
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a true self he cannot effectively reach. In a concluding sequence that
powerfully challenges the reader—”You, dogged, uninsultable, print-oriented
bastard” (127)—Barth concludes by forcing us to confront what Bergson called
“the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object” which has projected that
life, leading us, strangely, “back into our own presence” (Time and Free Will
133-4). As Barth writes, “What sort of a story is it whose drama lies always in
the next frame out?” (Funhouse 121). The balancing and vanishing acts always
flirt with the slump of life-embodied-in-literature toward death-embodied-inliterature.
Many further examples of Barth’s evocation of the illogical nature of the
literary representation of time and identity may be culled from Funhouse. In
“Anonymiad” the reader peers with Helen (a cow) into a pit to verify “that
[the narrator] was trapped or dead,” only to be shocked by the narrator’s
vigorous self-destructiveness (Funhouse 199). The comedy here is dark,
mechanistic, based on the struggle of the living to surmount the vortex of dead
habits and patterns of artistic creation. In “Title” the masquerade of literary
process begins “Beginning.” In attempting to tell the “story of our life. . . [and]
fill the blank,” the writer apparently achieves only a mediocre effect.
“Conventional startling opener, comments the female character who has just
been introduced: “‘Sorry if I’m interrupting the Progress of Literature,’ she
said, in a tone that adjective clause suggesting good-humored irony but in fact
defensively and imperfectly masking a taunt” (105). The text (and through it
our pleasure) is disrupted by insertion of general markers in place of their
artistic expression (“Title,” “Beginning,” “Plot and theme,” “adjective clause,”
“gerundive,” “long participial phrase,” etc.), but always just at the limit of the
reader’s tolerance for teasing: “I can’t finish anything; that is my final work.
Yet it’s these interruptions that make it a story. Escalate the conflict further.
Please let me start over” (107). It is all a mockery of “[h]ow sophisticated we
are today,” allowing us to lament the fact that “[h]istoricity and selfawareness. . . are always fatal to innocence and spontaneity” (110).
The historicity that Barth suggests is always fatal to spontaneity is
presented multiple times in Funhouse, particularly in “Anonymiad” and
“Menelaid.” The latter story carries the concept of the frame-tale to absurd
lengths. In the sixth section the narration has buried itself six levels,
represented by quotations within quotations:
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ “How now!” Menelaus cried.’ I ditto,” et cetera. “ ‘ “Espouse?
Espouse her? As lover? Advocate? Husband? Can’t you speak more plainly?
Who am I?”
“‘“‘“‘“”’”’”’”
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Working with buried cultural material—employing the “mythic method” that
T.S. Eliot advocated after he read Joyce’s Ulysses—has its limits, and leads in
this case to confusions about identity that aren’t just jokes. The emptiness
between the punctuation marks constitutes both taunt and an invitation to fill
in the blank. He cannot “speak more plainly,” given the cultural moment of
the modern writer.
Barth is perhaps like his narrator, “surfeited with clever irony,” so that the
only invention possible is that of parody, the only novelty left a gesture of
hopelessness, a caricature of failure, an “allegedly ultimate story” offered as “a
form of artistic fill in the blank” (111). In Barth’s fiction, a metafictional
confrontation is taking place. The writer confronts the limits of novelty and
experimentation. As he expresses the narrator’s frustration, Barth never lets us
forget the modern storyteller’s inescapable dilemma:
Oh God comma I abhor self-consciousness. I despise what we have come to;
I loathe our loathsome loathing, our place our time our situation, our
loathsome art, this ditto necessary story. The blank of our lives. It’s about
over. Let the dénouement be soon and unexpected, painless if possible, quick
at least, above all soon. Now now! How in the world will it ever (113)

The ending is broken off (open-ended?), the abhorrence endless, the invitation
to the reader to fill in the “blank[s] of our lives” still open. But a primary
lament remains the story’s burden: the impossibility of fresh narrative in an
age of sophistication, the hopelessness of invention in a world where
everything has already been invented, and the claustrophobia produced by the
shrinking literary universe.
These themes and this situation are only worth writing about if one has
taken a Bergsonian perspective on literary aesthetics. The closer one looks at
the practices of postmodern writers, the more explanatory become Bergsonian
concepts in reading their works.

Bergson and Poststructuralism: Deleuze, Derrida,
Barthes
That last claim cannot be satisfactorily shown here, I am aware. I have
sought to expose some convincing presence of Bergsonian concepts in works
of Barth and Nabokov, and allude to such concepts in the work of a few other
writers. Let me conclude with some remarks on philosophical and aesthetic
writings related to the literary moment of postmodernism, especially those of
Gilles Deleuze, Frederic Jameson, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes.
Deleuze’s adaptation of Bergsonian concepts in his short study Bergsonism
and his longer and highly detailed texts Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, extend
Bergson’s project to represent the historical consciousness—the mind at work
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connecting the present with the past in ever-changing, always-evolving
patterns. For Deleuze, cinema is the medium in which the philosophy of a
postmodern consciousness is both theorized and made real: “We must no
longer ask ourselves, ‘What is cinema?’ but ‘What is philosophy?’” (Cinema 2
280). Deleuze conceives the body as without “organs”—merely a part of a
system of “cutting” and rationalization. That system is a Bergsonian one of
tensions between closure and containment, quality and quantity. Film, as we
have it from Deleuze, reveals the ultimately disembodied nature of experience.
Film, despite Bergson’s critique of the early film-camera, embodies Bergson’s
notion of the durée and re-orders our questions regarding the meaning of
body-representations, both in the individual human consciousness, and in
society at large; it makes time and subjectivity central to cultural activity.
Deleuze thus highlights the Bergsonian oppositions between the élan vital and
materiality, and between the durée réelle and intellectual representation. His
notion of infinitely circulating desire is akin to Barthes’s writerly text, in that it
constitutes an attempt to escape spatialized representations of life and enter
into experienced, real time.
Such a Bergsonian conflict seems to be central to writers of poststructural
philosophy. As Berndt Clavier has argued, postmodernism “has been
theorized primarily as a spatial and spatializing phenomenon, or more
properly as that ‘spatialization of time’ which [William V.] Spanos already in
1971 suggested defined postmodernism in the arts” (68).8 Frederic Jameson
reinforces Clavier’s claim that postmodernity is essentially the product of
spatialization, and that “space is what represses temporality and temporal
figurality absolutely” (Jameson 62ff.). What seems to have been forgotten here
is that in literature of the modernist era a confrontation between experienced
time and spatialization had already occurred, and that modernism had already
established that the self-conscious use of spatializing techniques can valorize
and evoke time-as-experience through its absence. The idea of a presence
evoking an absence is illustrated in the ways artists render dynamism through
appallingly static characters and situations. To state this principle differently,
experienced time is powerfully evoked through images of space. For example,
Faulkner repeatedly offers imagery of stasis and resistance, intended to make
the flow of time appear in our imaginations—as when he describes the birds in
Light in August as hanging in “still-winged and tremulous suspension” (85-6).
Sartre misapprehended Faulkner and complained that he had “decapitated
time” because he had removed the possibility for "free choice and act" (230).
But as I am arguing, the portrayal of “volitionless” characters, like Joe
Christmas and Joanna Burden, leads the reader back to what is absent: time,
flux, and freedom. A similar effect is achieved with excruciating discipline by
Alain Robbe-Grillet in La jalousie, in which time is “stopped” by an emotionless
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commentary, with the effect for the reader being quite the opposite—an
enhanced awareness of emotionality and the unstoppability of time.9
The literary technique of employing a stultifying stasis to evoke flux
evolved in response to the problem of language’s origins and limits, and on
this subject there are few philosophers whose ideas seem to anticipate
poststructural thought as closely as Bergson. As Suzanne Guerlac says,
Derrida took a perspective on language “very close to Bergson’s,” and she
asserts the “proximity of Derrida’s notion of deconstruction as writing practice and
Bergson’s keen analysis of the limits of language in the face of time” (185, 186).
Daniel Alipaz has recently followed on this research path with an incisive
essay on Bergson and Derrida. As Alipaz argues, Derrida “pushes language to
the brink” in order to bring it into the sphere of the spiritual (l’esprit) (117).
Alipaz further argues that Derrida’s concept of the future “is a constantly
unfolding one, a movement that defies understanding at its very root, but
simultaneously, like Bergsonian durée, is creative” (111-12). There is “an
unquestionable overlap between their two discourses” (99), and Alipaz hopes
that the “confluence between Bergson and Derrida will continue to revitalize
Bergson’s often misunderstood dualisms in light of their development by key
poststructural figures” (117).
An example of this “confluence” can be found in Bergson’s critique of the
idea of nothingness, which anticipates foundational concepts of deconstruction
and poststructuralist literary theory, especially the “presence in absence”
principle to which we have already alluded. Bergson wrote in Creative
Evolution: “[T]here is more, and not less in the idea of an object conceived as “not
existing” than in the idea of this same object conceived as “existing”; for the idea of the
object “not existing” is necessarily the idea of the object “existing” with, in addition,
the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block”
(Creative Evolution 286; Bergson’s italics). Bergson asserts that language escapes
and then reorients the paths of philosophical inquiry, and in doing so, he
seems to anticipate Derrida’s analysis of presence and absence, epitomized in
his claim (to be echoed by Barthes) that “there is nothing outside the text” [il
n’y a pas de hors-texte] (Derrida 143, 158). Derrida’s clever use of negation here
echoes Creative Evolution’s fourth chapter.
And just as there is a harmony between Derrida and Bergson, so there is a
parallel between Bergson and Barthes. Barthes’s idea of the “writerly text” is
bound up in the flow of time, “a perpetual present”: The writerly text is
“ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function)
is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized.” Barthes imagines a text that has
transcended stasis, maintaining its allegiance to the mobile, the flux of time,
and to “plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of
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languages” (S/Z 5). He opposes such texts to “readerly texts” that are merely
conventional productions of a culture, familiar patterns, and part of a closed
system. In the perpetual present that is the writerly text, interpretation changes
its nature and follows another path. As Barthes says, “To interpret a text is not
to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the
contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it.” Such a text forms not a single
world, but “a galaxy of signifiers. . . [that] has no beginning” (ibid.). Barthes
admits that no text is invulnerable to being oversimplified by critical
discourse, so “systems of meaning” can always assault and “take over this
absolutely plural text,” but something in the plural (writerly) text always
remains open, inviting the creative act. In claiming that the writerly text
constitutes a “perpetual present” that remains perpetually “open” (in defiance
of the language’s pragmatic tendencies), Barthes seems to state a Bergsonian
view of literature, in which a writer must choose to be difficult, selecting
disparate images, disparate expressions, which collide and coalesce, making a
text that defies the intellect’s totalizing force and paternalistic control:
The interpretation demanded by a specific text, in its plurality, is in no way
liberal: it is not a question of conceding some meanings, of magnanimously
acknowledging that each one has its share of truth; it is a question, against
all in-difference, of asserting the very existence of plurality, which is not that
of the true, the probable, or even the possible. This necessary assertion is
difficult, however, for as nothing exists outside the text, there is never a
whole of the text (which would by reversion form an internal order, a
reconciliation of the complementary parts, under the paternal eye of the
representative Model): the text must simultaneously be distinguished from
its exterior and from its totality. All of which comes down to saying that for
the plural text, there cannot be a narrative structure, a grammar, or a logic;
thus, if one or another of these are sometimes permitted to come forward, it
is in proportion (giving this expression its full quantitative value) as we are
dealing with incompletely plural texts, texts whose plural is more or less
parsimonious. (S/Z 6)

To leave “structure” behind engenders a poststructuralist angst; for what will
substitute for “structure”? For Barthes, something like Bergsonian “becoming”
has become a textual “center.” The text is defined as our experience, and it
tries to merge us into the fundamental flow of life, transcending language,
defying grammar and logic and narrative structures, and distancing itself
ironically from its own seriousness in order to sneak under readers’ defenses.
In stating this principle—if I am correct—Barthes seems to validate Bergson’s
continuing significance for the world of literary theory and for the modern
artist, who must theorize, must incessantly forge writing anew, and must
endure the modern era’s demand for ceaseless novelty and experimentation.
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Notes
1. The list of modernist writers who have already been deeply connected by scholarship to
Bergsonian thought is long: Jacques Maritain, Nikos Kazantzakis, T. E. Hulme, John
Middleton Murry, Julien Benda, Wyndham Lewis, T. S. Eliot, Willa Cather, Louis-Ferdinand
Céline, Joseph Conrad, William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Robert Frost, Eugène Ionesco,
James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, Marianne Moore, Vladimir Nabokov, Ezra
Pound, Marcel Proust, John Crowe Ransom, Dorothy Richardson, Gertrude Stein, John
Steinbeck, Wallace Stevens, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, William Carlos Williams,
Thomas Wolfe, Virginia Woolf.
2. It is worth noting how intertwined the terms “modern” and “postmodern” have always
been, that even in what Barth dubs the “proto-modern” period (the latter part of the
nineteenth century), the term “postmodern” was already at play, as Ihab Hassan has shown.
12-14.
3. I am here defining “postmodern” as “resistance postmodernism,” in Hal Foster’s apt
phrase from The Return of the Real, or in other words, a neo-avant garde movement as opposed
to that postmodernism which Lyotard and Jameson define as complicit with capitalism.
4. Some essential book-length studies include Mark Antliff’s Inventing Bergson (1992), Paul
Douglass and Fred Burwick’s The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy
(1992), Douglass’s Bergson, Eliot, and American Literature (1986), Tom Quirk’s Bergson and
American Culture (1990), Rosa Slegers’ Courageous Vulnerability: Ethics and Knowledge in Proust,
Bergson, Marcel, and James (2010), Mary Ann Gillies’ Henri Bergson and British Modernism (1996),
and Michael Glynn’s Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian and Russian Formalist Influences in his Novels
(2007).
5. Bergson was forced to reserve seats at lectures for his students, since journalists, tourists,
clergy, foreign students, and even ladies of fashion came to the hall at the Sorbonne. The
philosopher faced a bewildering logjam of admirers bearing bouquets and gifts, through
which he would have to push his way to the podium, on one occasion protesting, "But . . . I
am not a dancer!" [“Mais. . . je ne suis pas une danseuse!”] The newspapers suggested he
move his "performances" to the Paris Opera. See Mosse-Bastide 34.
6. William James has aptly expressed this idea in the phrase, “stream of consciousness”
(employed by him in 1890 in Principles of Psychology) which has been preferred by many critics
of the past over Bergson’s complex of concepts (memory, élan vital, durée réelle). Bergson’s,
however, are more productive for an understanding of modern and postmodern aesthetics.
James was a proponent of Bergsonism, and agreed with the diminished role assigned by
Bergson to the analytic powers of the intellect when used to understand the deep inner
experience of time: “The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a
spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the
darkness looks.” 236-37.
7. See also Douglass, “The Theory of Poetry.” 245-60.
8. Clavier alludes to Spanos 147-68.
9. La jalousie begins: “Now the shadow of the column—the column which supports the
southwest corner of the roof—divides the corresponding corner of the veranda into two equal
parts.” 33.
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